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Are We Allowing the Thing to Speak for Itself?
Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy and Res Ipsa Loquitur
in Louisiana
I. INTRODUCTION
"We can imagine no reason why, with ordinary care human
toes could not be left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found
in chewing tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has been very
careless."
And such is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Latin for "the thing speaks for itself," it is a jurisprudential rule
of evidence that allows a plaintiff to meet the burden of proving a
defendant's breach in a negligence claim using only circumstantial
evidence.2 The fact finder infers negligence based on his
experience that such accidents do not occur in the absence of
negligence. For example, in a case where human toes are found in
a sealed package of chewing tobacco, a plaintiff is likely to have
no direct evidence of the manufacturer's negligence-only the
circumstances surrounding his injury.4 Yet, it is clear that the harm
was, more likely than not, caused by a breach of the
manufacturer's duty to its customer.5 The unusual circumstance of
finding the toes "speaks for itself'-that the manufacturer was
probably negligent. If the plaintiffs case meets the requirements
for res ipsa loquitur, he receives the benefit of the doctrine-
permitting the fact finder to infer the defendant's breach based on
the available circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff can survive the
defendant's motions for both summary judgment and directed
verdict, allowinf his case to reach a jury despite the absence of
direct evidence.
Although the purpose of res ipsa loquitur is clear, the elements,
effect, and burden of proof of the doctrine differ from jurisdiction
Copyright 2011, by ALAN W. STEWART.
1. Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 366 (Miss. 1918).
2. Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 41
(La. 2007) (citing Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 945 So.
2d 1, 8 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006)); Wex S. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by
Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 72-73
(1941).
3. Montgomery v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 540 So. 2d 312, 319 (La. 1989).
4. See id.
5. See id
6. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 40, at 257-58 (5th ed. 1984).
7. See id. at 258.
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to jurisdiction.8 In some courts the plaintiff always bears the
burden of proof, and in other courts, the burden shifts to the
defendant when the plaintiff successfully invokes the res ipsa
doctrine. 9 Sometimes the doctrine creates a presumption of
neglience; other times it only permits a fact finder's inference of
such. Louisiana courts have had similar conflicting opinions over
the doctrine's rules, despite the efforts of the Louisiana Supreme
Court to clear up some of the confusion.'
In 2007 in Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy, the Louisiana
Supreme Court addressed the requirements for a plaintiff to be
entitled to a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction.12 That opinion
heightened the standard to obtain such an instruction making it
extraordinarily difficult for the issue to reach a jury. This Note
argues that the court erred in creating such a high standard for
applicability of the doctrine. Additionally, even if the plaintiff can
meet this standard, Linnear makes the procedural effect of the
doctrine only a permissive inference, as opposed to a rebuttable
presumption. 4 Because res ipsa loquitur continues to have this
light procedural effect and narrow applicability due to the difficult
Linnear requirements, the doctrine, as it stands today in Louisiana,
is no longer efficacious. Ironically, this evidentiary doctrine that
was originally created to assist a plaintiff in bringing a negligence
claim now hampers his ability to do so. This Note argues that the
doctrine should either, in some instances, produce a rebuttable
presumption or be eliminated from Louisiana law altogether.
Part II of this Note explores the history of res ipsa loquitur and
explains the current state of the doctrine in Louisiana, including
8. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
9. Although some courts recognize a shifting burden toward the defendant,
this burden is usually the burden of producing evidence. See Annotation, Res
Ipsa Loquitur in Its Relation to Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence, 59
A.L.R. 486 (1929); 92 A.L.R. 653 (1934).
10. Courts frequently and fallaciously interchanged the terms
"presumption" and "inference," referring to a presumption of negligence when
the actual effect was a permissive inference of negligence. See Annotation, "Res
Ipsa Loquitur" as a Presumption or a Mere Permissible Inference, 53 A.L.R.
1494 (1928); 167 A.L.R. 658 (1947).
11. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
12. Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 42
(La. 2007).
13. Several cases illustrate the recent trend of plaintiffs being denied the use
of res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g., Pinegar v. Harris, 20 So. 3d 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1st
2009); Dronette v. Shelter Ins. Co., 998 So. 2d 942 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008);
Kramer v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 999 So. 2d 101 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008);
Desoto v. Ford Motor Co., 975 So. 2d 195 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008); Williams v.
A&M Operating Co., 973 So. 2d 138 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007).
14. Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 43.
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the requirements for its applicability and its procedural effect. Part
III discusses Linnear, particularly its statement of the rule for
obtaining a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction. Part IV argues that res
ipsa loquitur should, in some cases, amount to a rebuttable
presumption, and if the courts hold that it does not, the doctrine
should be abolished from Louisiana law.
II. BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTIUNE
A. Origins of the Doctrine
The first reported use of the term "res ipsa loquitur" in court
was during the Byrne v. Boadle case in 1863 by the Assessor of the
Court of Passage at Liverpool.15 The "res" described in the case
was the circumstance of the plaintiffs injury caused by a barrel of
flour that fell out of a warehouse window. Noting the obvious
negligence of the warehouse owner, even in the absence of direct
evidence, Chief Baron Pollock said, "There are certain cases of
which it may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems one of
them."07
A similar case arose two years later, in 1865, in the Court of
Exchequer.' 8 In Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., the
plaintiff claimed that he was injured by a bag of sugar dropped
from a crane.' 9 Without reference to Byrne or the words "res ipsa
loquitur," Chief Justice Erle stated the first explanation of this new
principle:
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But
where the thing is shewn to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants,
that the accident arose from want of care.
The merging of both the phrase and doctrine, however, did not
occur until Briggs v. Oliver in 1866, when a packing case fell on
15. (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch.).
16. William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REV.
183, 183 (1949).
17. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 301.
18. See Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., (1865) 159 Eng. Rep.
665 (Exch.) 668.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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the plaintiff's foot.21 In that case, the barons of the Court of
Exchequer referenced Baron Pollock's phrase "res ipsa loquitur"
and held that the mere occurrence of the injury allowed the
plaintiff to take his case to the jury.22
Since its inception, the doctrine has confused American courts.
Many judges confounded res ipsa loquitur cases with typical
carrier cases.23 Because carriers contracted to safely transport
passengers, they were held to a strict standard and bore the burden
of proof in those cases in which passengers were injured. 24 Courts
then mistakenly held that res ipsa loquitur only applied when a
defendant had undertaken responsibility for the plaintiffs safety.2 5
Because of this misguided line of thinking, some courts later held
that the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine created a
presumption of the defendant's negligence. 26 Further perpetuating
confusion about the doctrine's effects, courts were very careless
with the terminology used in their opinions, frequently
interchanging the terms "presumption" and "inference." 2 7 Despite
the confusion that resulted from the crossbreeding of earlier carrier
cases and the Latin utterance of Baron Pollock, the doctrine
continued to develop in the United States.28
B. The Doctrine in Louisiana Law
1. Origin
Although not considered a res ipsa loquitur case at the time,
Maus v. Broderick in 1899 may be the first Louisiana case to use
the doctrine.29 In this New Orleans case, a "vicious and strong-
bodied" horse raced down St. Charles Avenue unattended. 0
21. (1866) 143 Rev. Rep. 680 (Exch.); 4 H. & C. 403 (Eng.).
22. G. Gregg Webb, Note, The Law of Falling Objects: Byrne v. Boadle
and the Birth ofRes Ipsa Loquitur, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1108 (2007).
23. One commentator claims that the roots of the doctrine go further back
than the carrier cases to the "English fire cases." Id. at 1081.
24. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 39, at 243; Prosser, supra note 16, at
185.
25. Prosser, supra note 16, at 186.
26. Id. at 188.
27. Annotation, "Res Ipsa Loquitur" as a Presumption or a Mere Permissive
Inference, 167 A.L.R. 658, 660 (1946) ("[T]he expressions 'presumption of
negligence' and 'inference of negligence' have been erroneously used
interchangeably, creating a labyrinthic confusion as to whether one rule or the
other rule prevails in a particular jurisdiction .....
28. Prosser, supra note 16, at 186.
29. 25 So. 977 (La. 1899).
30. Id.
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Pulling a heavy vehicle, it crashed into a dairy wagon, throwing
the wagon's driver onto the ground.3 ' The plaintiff-driver had no
evidence of the horse owner's negligence except for the
circumstances of the injury.32 Still, the Louisiana Supreme Court
awarded damages to the driver, despite the fact that she could not
explain the defendant's specific breach.33
Since that opinion, Louisiana courts have continuously
developed the doctrine, but much like the common law courts, they
experienced significant confusion about the requirements for the
doctrine's applicability and its effects.34 However, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has over the years clarified the ambiguous
language and misconceptions concerning res ipsa loquitur,
including issues of available evidence, burden of proof,
requirements for applicability, and the doctrine's effects.
2. Evidentiary Requirements
Although both direct and circumstantial evidence can satisfy a
plaintiffs burden of proof in typical negligence cases, most
negligence cases are decided largely upon circumstantial
evidence.36 Res ipsa loquitur assists the plaintiff in using the
available circumstantial evidence to present a prima facie case of
negligence.3 7
The most important requirement for the use of res ipsa loquitur
is the lack of direct evidence to explain the injury, and Louisiana
jurisprudence only applies the doctrine when no direct evidence
31. Id.
32. Id. at 978.
33. Id. at 979.
34. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
35. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
36. Malone, supra note 2, at 71. "Circumstantial evidence . . . is 'evidence
of one fact, or of a set of facts, from which the existence of the fact to be
determined may reasonably be inferred."' Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake
Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654, 664-65 (La. 1990) (quoting KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 39, at 242). Direct evidence, on the other hand, establishes a fact
"which has been testified to by witnesses as having come under the cognizance
of their senses." Id. at 664 (citing J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 25, at 954 (1983)).
On the denial of rehearing for Linnear, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeal judges stated that circumstantial evidence is more reliable than eye
witness testimony "since there is usually no bias or interest associated with [it]
(such as fingerprints, DNA, blood types)." Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy
Entex/Reliant Energy, 945 So. 2d 1, 24 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006), rev'd, 966 So.
2d 36 (La. 2007).
37. Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 665 (citing J. LEE & B. LINDAHL, MODERN
TORT LAW § 1522 n.4 (rev. ed. 1898)).
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exists to assist the plaintiff in presenting his negligence case.3 8 If
direct evidence is available, nothing is left for the fact finder to
infer, so the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not available to the
plaintiff.3 9 In fact, the unavailability of direct evidence to the
plaintiff is the reason to invoke res ipsa loquitur because the
defendant is usually in a better position to explain the cause of the
accident where he has more access to evidence. 40 For example, in
the case involving tobacco and human toes, the manufacturer had
exclusive control over its production and packaging processes, so it
had more evidence to present its case-a denial of negligence. 4 1
3. Criteria
In Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center,
the Louisiana Supreme Court established three criteria for the
doctrine's applicability: (1) the injury is the kind that does not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the evidence
must sufficiently eliminate other more probable causes of the
injury, such as the conduct of the plaintiff or a third person; and (3)
the negligence of the defendant must fall within the scope of his
duty to the plaintiff.42 If the judge finds that the plaintiff meets
38. Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 42
(La. 2007) ("[R]es ipsa loquitur is only applicable where the plaintiff offers only
circumstantial evidence from which negligence might be inferred . . . .");
Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 938 So. 2d 35, 44 (La. 2006)
("The doctrine does not apply if direct evidence sufficiently explains the
injury."); Walker v. Union Oil Mill, Inc., 369 So. 2d 1043, 1048 (La. 1979)
("Res ipsa loquitur does not apply if there is sufficient direct evidence
explaining the occurrence and establishing the details of the negligence
charged."). A plaintiff is allowed to present expert testimony in res ipsa loquitur
cases. See Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 667 n. 11. Also, "a plaintiff cannot take
advantage of the doctrine where direct evidence of defendant's possible
negligence is available, but [cannot] be considered because the plaintiffs [have]
tampered with the evidence before the defendants [can] examine it." Linnear,
966 So. 2d at 42.
39. William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20
MINN. L. REv. 241, 254 (1936).
40. Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 665 n.7 ("This lack of direct evidence to prove
the defendant's negligence 'actually furnishes the occasion and necessity for
invoking the rule in its strict and distinctive sense."' (quoting Larkin v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1957))); Prosser, supra note
39, at 242 ("Dean Wigmore says further that the force and justification of the
principle lies in the fact that the evidence of the true cause of the accident is
accessible to the defendant, and not accessible to the plaintiff.").
41. See Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 366 (Miss. 1918).
42. Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 665-66. These are the same criteria found in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D
(1965).
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these three criteria, the judge will give the res ipsa loquitur
instruction to the jury.4 3
Initially, Louisiana courts held that res ipsa loquitur was
inapplicable if the defendant could show any other reasonably
possible explanation for the plaintiffs injury." However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Boudreaux v. American Insurance Co.
narrowed this defense, holding that the defendant's explanation of
the accident must be equally as probable as or more probable than
the plaintiffs inference of the defendant's negligence.45 For
example, in Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., the plaintiffs were injured
by the jerkiness of an elevator while loading pallets of paper.46
Their claim was against the elevator company for negligent
maintenance, but the court held that the plaintiffs' own negligence
was equally or more plausibly the cause of the injury. 47 The court
reasoned that a piece of the plaintiffs' pallet may have broken off
and fallen into the elevator shaft, interrupting the interlock's
electrical current.48
Additionally, Louisiana courts once considered the defendant's
exclusive control of the injury-causing instrument a necessary
element for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur.49 Courts,
however, have not strictly applied this requirement.50 Currently, a
plaintiff can use evidence of the defendant's exclusive control to
exclude the possibility of his own negligence or a third party's
negligence because physical control of the instrument by the
43. Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 666.
44. See, e.g., Larkin, 97 So. 2d at 392.
45. 264 So. 2d 621, 636 (La. 1972).
46. 601 So. 2d 1355, 1356-57 (La. 1992).
47. Id. at 1363.
48. Id. at 1358.
49. Weber v. Fid. & Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 250 So. 2d 754, 765 (La. 1971)
(Hamlin, J., dissenting) ("It is settled in our law that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies only when the instrumentality alleged to have caused the
damage is in the actual or constructive control of the defendant, or where
plaintiff has proved freedom of fault on the part of all whose hands the
instrumentality passed after leaving defendant."); Nw. Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Allain,
77 So. 2d 395, 397 (La. 1955) ("It is well established in the Louisiana
jurisprudence that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must be applied to a case if
the accident which damaged plaintiff was caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the actual or constructive control of the defendant . . . .").
50. Spott, 601 So. 2d at 1362; Hake v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 28 So. 2d
441, 445 (La. 1946) ("While it is true that the possession test seems to have been
employed in many of the cases in our jurisprudence to determine the
applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, it is also true that there are other
cases, involving a certain type of accident, wherein the matter of possession in
the defendant was not an important consideration.").
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defendant allows little room for inferences other than an inference
of the defendant's negligence.5
The Cangelosi court further explained the standard to apply its
three-pronged test, stating that it was the same as the directed
verdict standard: "whether the facts and inferences point so
strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable
men could not arrive at a contrary verdict." 52 The court added, "If
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on whether the
defendant's negligence caused the plaintiffs injury, then the judge
must present the issue to the jury and instruct the jury on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur."5 3
4. Effect
Because negligence must always be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence, the applicability of res ipsa loquitur does not
change the plaintiffs burden of proving that the defendant's
negligence was more likely than not the cause of the injury.54 After
all, res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence to help a plaintiff
satisfy his burden of producing evidence.55
As in typical negligence cases res ipsa loquitur never shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant. In the past, however, Louisiana
courts differed on this issue, with some courts holding that the
burden does in fact shift to the defendant.5 7 Part of the
51. Malone, supra note 2, at 81.
52. Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654,
666-67 (La. 1990).
53. Id. at 667.
54. Id. at 665.
55. FRANK L. MARAIST, EVIDENCE AND PROOF § 4.3, in 19 LOuISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 78 (2d ed. 2007).
56. Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 665; see also Malone, supra note 2, at 91 ("If
the courts shift the burden of persuasion under res ipsa loquitur, they thereby
place a premium upon ignorance and weakness. It is not the usual policy under
any modem system of law to relieve the plaintiff of the normal burden of
proving his case merely because he does not have the available evidence.").
57. See Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 938 So. 2d 35, 44
(La. 2006) ("[T]he doctrine does not dispense with the rule that negligence must
be proved. It simply gives the plaintiff the right to place on the scales, 'along
with proof of the accident and enough of the attending circumstances to invoke
the rule, an inference of negligence' sufficient to shift the burden of proof");
Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., 601 So. 2d 1355, 1362 (La. 1992) ("The plaintiff, of
course, bears the initial burden of proof."); Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 666 ("Use
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a negligence case, as in any case involving
circumstantial evidence, does not relieve the plaintiff of the ultimate burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence all of the elements necessary for a
recovery."); Pilie v. Nat'l Food Stores of La., Inc., 158 So. 2d 162, 165 (La.
1098 [Vol. 71
inconsistency may be due to an incorrect adoption of the doctrine
from common law courts with respect to its burden-shifting
effect.5 8 When common law courts stated in the past that the
burden of proof rests with the defendant, they may have actually
meant that the plaintiff's case will not be dismissed solely because
of the inadequacy of his own proof.59 Unfortunately, by expressly
stating that the doctrine has a burden-shifting effect, courts
established a precedent that created confusion in later res ipsa
loquitur cases.
If all of the required elements of res ipsa loquitur are present
and the court instructs the jury on the doctrine, its current
procedural effect is only a permissive inference of negligence,
rather than a presumption of such.60 This means that the jury may
or may not infer a defendant's negligence based on the evidence
presented.61 Previous Louisiana jurisprudence has stated that the
doctrine creates a "presumption" of negligence, as opposed to an
"inference," but this is most likely due to a careless interchanging
of the two words by judges.6 Because of this effect of a
1963) ("It is the duty of the plaintiff to prove negligence affirmatively . . . .");
Day v. Nat'l U.S. Radiator Corp., 128 So. 2d 660, 664 (La. 1961) ("When the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to a case, the accident which has
caused plaintiffs damages makes out a prima facie case of negligence by the
defendant, and the burden is then on the defendant to show absence of
negligence on his part.").
58. Professor Wex Malone believed that Louisiana courts erroneously
adopted a shifting burden of persuasion from common law courts. When he
wrote his article in 1941, a motion for directed verdict in Louisiana could only
be made after both sides presented their cases. Because a defendant in a
common law court could move for a directed verdict after the plaintiff presented
his evidence, the shifting burden mentioned in common law courts was only the
burden of producing evidence. Thus, the applicability of res ipsa loquitur only
allowed a plaintiff to avoid a directed verdict for the defendant, and the
defendant then must have presented evidence to rebut the inference of his
negligence. Malone, supra note 2, at 84-86.
59. Id. at 89.
60. Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 42
(La. 2007).
61. Cangelosi, 564 So. 2d at 666.
62. See Spott, 601 So. 2d at 1362 ("Res ipsa loquitur as a 'qualification of
the general rule that negligence is not to be presumed,' must be sparingly
applied." (quoting Day, 128 So. 2d at 665)); Pilie, 158 So. 2d at 165 ("It is the
duty of the plaintiff to prove negligence affirmatively; and, while the inference
allowed by the rules of res ipsa loquitur constitute such proof, it is only where
the circumstances leave no room for a different presumption that the rule
applies."); Day, 128 So. 2d at 664 ("When the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable to a case, the accident which has caused plaintiffs damages makes
out a prima facie case of negligence by the defendant, and the burden is then on
2011] NOTE 1099
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permissive inference, the burden of persuasion in a res ipsa
loquitur case is on the plaintiff to convince the fact finder that the
inference of the defendant's negligence is more probable than any
other ossible inference regarding the cause of the plaintiffs
injury.
Because of Cangelosi and other recent Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions the law on res ipsa loquitur was, until recently,
relatively clear. The plaintiff always bears the burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence; to invoke the doctrine, the
plaintiff must have no direct evidence available to support his
cause of action; the plaintiffs case must succeed on all three
Cangelosi factors before the judge will give a res ipsa loquitur
instruction to the jury; and once reaching a jury, the effect of the
doctrine is only a permissive inference.6 5  Some problems,
however, still existed after Cangelosi. Lower courts, for example,
had problems applying the three factors coherent with the same
"directed verdict" language set forth in Cangelosi. The Louisiana
Supreme Court attempted to resolve this issue and the applicability
of the Cangelosi factors in Linnear.
III. LINNEAR V. CENTERPoiNT ENERGY
In Linnear, plaintiffs Charles and Dronzy Linnear sued
defendant CenterPoint Energy for injuries caused by a sinkhole in
their yard.68 Eleven days before the injury, agents for CenterPoint
arrived at the Linnears' house to investigate a gas leak.69 The
the defendant to show absence of negligence on his part."); Loprestie v. Roy
Motors, Inc., 185 So. 11, 13 (La. 1938) ("The accident itself makes out a prima
facie case, and the burden is on the defendant to show absence of negligence.");
Lykiardopoulo v. New Orleans & C.R., Light & Power Co., 53 So. 575, 576
(La. 1910) ("[T]he rule of evidence is that the accident speaks for itself-res
ipsa loquitur-that is to say, that a presumption of negligence arises from the
fact itself of the accident.").
63. Albert Tate, Jr., Wex Malone and Res Ipsa Loquitur in Louisiana Tort
Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 1397, 1403 (1984).
64. See, e.g., Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 938 So. 2d 35
(La. 2006); Spott, 601 So. 2d at 1355; Montgomery v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp.,
540 So. 2d 312 (La. 1989); Walker v. Union Oil Mill, Inc., 369 So. 2d 1043 (La.
1979); Boudreaux v. Am. Ins. Co., 264 So. 2d 621 (La. 1972).
65. See supra Part II.B.2-3.
66. Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 43
(La. 2007).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 38.
69. Id.
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agents dug a trench around the house to install a new gas line and
later filled and resodded the trench.70 Mrs. Linnear alleged that
when she was exiting her car days later, she stepped into a sinkhole
that came up to her right knee.' She was dianosed with a
herniated disk and, as a result, underwent surgery. The Linnears
alleged that CenterPoint's negligence in filling the trench and
resodding the area caused the injuries. 73
The trial court refused Mrs. Linnear's request for a res ipsa
loquitur jury instruction, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of
CenterPoint.74 The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal
concluded that the refusal to give the res ipsa loquitur jury
instruction constituted legal error that impeded the jury's fact-
finding process.75 On a de novo review, the court granted judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs for $273,032.74.76 The Louisiana Supreme
Court granted writs.
After a review of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held that the
district court correctly refused to give the jury instruction.7 7 First,
the court said that it was not a "circumstantial evidence only"
case. Mrs. Linnear gave her testimony about the accident; both
Mr. and Mrs. Linnear testified about the condition of the yard after
the installation of the gas line; and two CenterPoint workers
testified as to the procedure used in filling the trench.79 Second, the
court held that the Linnears' case did not pass the first criterion of
the three-part Cangelosi test: that the injury must be the kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence.so The court
reasoned, "People fall in their yards and injure themselves all the
time without any third party involvement at all."
Most importantly, the court discussed the requirements for a
res ipsa loquitur jury instruction previously discussed in
Cangelosi.82 The phrase "if reasonable minds could reach different
70. Id. at 38-39.
71. Id. at 39.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 38-39.
74. Id. at 40.
75. Id. at 41; Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 945 So.
2d 1, 11 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006), rev'd, 966 So. 2d 36 (La. 2007).
76. Linnear, 945 So. 2d at 13.
77. Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 44.
78. Id. at 42. Plaintiffs did, however, present circumstantial evidence-a
photograph of the footprint, taken by Mr. Linnear. Id. at 39.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 44.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 41-44.
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conclusions on whether the defendant's negligence caused the
plaintiffs injury" confused judges in the lower courts, so the
Louisiana Supreme Court decided that a clarification was
necessary. Some courts believed it meant that the instruction
must be given any time the parties presented conflicting evidence
of negligence and reasonable minds could reach different
conclusions as to whether the defendant's negligence harmed the
plaintiff.84 According to that analysis, every case would present
only two options: either a directed verdict for the defendant or a res
ipsa loquitur jury instruction for the plaintiff.85 The Linnear court
explained that the test was actually if reasonable minds could differ
on the presence of all three criteria, taking each criterion
individually and sequentially.86 If reasonable minds could differ on
all three, then the res ipsa loquitur instruction should be given.8 7 If
reasonable minds could not differ as to the non-fulfillment of any
single criterion, the instruction should not be given, and the
analysis ends.88
The court also had to clarify the language from Cangelosi that
held that the standard for a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction was
the same for a directed verdict.8 9 In that opinion, Justice Lemmon
held that the standard to grant a res ipsa loquitur instruction was
"whether the facts and inferences point so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable men could
not arrive at a contrary verdict.,"o Two ad hoc udges from the
Louisiana Second Circuit criticized this standard.9 In a dissent for
a denial of rehearing in Linnear, they stated that Justice Lemmon
cited no direct authority for applying the standard.92 Furthermore,
the judges called it a "single-Justice opinion," arguing that none of
the other justices (either in the dissents or concurrence) agreed
83. Id. at 43.
84. Id. at 42-43 (citing Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant
Energy, 945 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006)).
85. Id. at 43.
86. Id. at 44.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 43.
90. Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654, 667
(La. 1990).
91. Six of the nine judges in the Louisiana Second Circuit Linnear opinion
recused themselves because Mr. Linnear had previously been a supervisor in the
court's building. Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 40-41. Judges Gallagher and Gonzales
were the two ad hoc judges. Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant
Energy, 945 So. 2d 1, 1 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006), rev'd, 966 So. 2d 36 (La. 2007).
92. Linnear, 945 So. 2d at 28 (Gallagher & Gonzales, JJ., dissenting from
denial of rehearing).
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with the standard.93 The Linnear court explained this "directed
verdict" language in a footnote, stating that it really meant that if
facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor
of the defendant on the three points, the instruction should not be
given.94
Currently, because of Linnear, plaintiffs in Louisiana must
meet a very high standard to be entitled to a res ipsa loquitur jury
instruction. 5 First, they must have no direct evidence available to
them.96 Second, they must satisfy each part of the Cangelosi test,
with the judge examining each of the three criteria individually and
determining if reasonable minds could differ as to each criterion. 9 7
Third, the jury, as fact finder, determines the existence of each of
the three criteria again.98 Finally, the determination by the jury that
the plaintiff met all criteria only creates a permissive inference of
the defendant's negligence, meaning that the jury may or may not
infer a breach of the defendant's duty based on the evidence
presented at trial."
IV. PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The current standard for res ipsa loquitur under Linnear
presents two problems: the prerequisites for a jury instruction are
exceedingly difficult to satisfy, and the procedural effect, once it
reaches the jury, is very light. After the plaintiff succeeds on the
three-part "reasonable minds" Cangelosi test twice (once with the
judge and once with the jury), the effect is simply a permissive
inference of the defendant's negligence-the least possible effect
of the doctrine.'0 0 This high standard and light procedural effect
severely limit the doctrine's applicability and seem to stray from
the purpose of the doctrine, which is to assist a plaintiff in bringing
a prima facie case of negligence based on the available
circumstantial evidence.' 0'
93. Id. at 29.
94. Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 44 n.5.
95. See infra note 125 for an example of a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction.
96. See supra Part II.B.2.
97. See supra Part II.B.2.
98. See supra Part II.B.2.
99. See supra Part II.B.3.
100. Cf Prosser, supra note 39, at 243.
101. Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654, 665
(La. 1990).
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A. Does Res Ipsa Loquitur Ever Create More Than a Permissive
Inference?
The effect of a permissive inference does little to help plaintiffs
prove negligence. When a judge instructs a jury that it may or may
not infer negligence from the evidence provided, the only benefit
that the plaintiff receives is a "nudge." 0 This "nudge" stems from
the authoritative position of the judge and may possibly sway a
jury toward a finding for the plaintiff.103 Otherwise, juries in res
ipsa loquitur cases simply do what they do in all negligence
cases-choose to infer or not to infer a defendant's negligence
based on the evidence.
This permissive inference shifts no "burden" to the defendant.104
In fact, if a defendant offers no evidence to rebut the plaintiffs
claim, he only runs the risk that the jury may rule against him.0I A
rebuttable presumption, on the other hand would shift the burden of
producing evidence to the defendant.'0 Thus, he must produce
evidence of greater weight than the plaintiffs evidence to survive a
summary judgment or directed verdict motion.107
In Louisiana res ipsa loquitur should, in special situations, have
the effect of a rebuttable presumption. In Cangelosi, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the standard for receiving a res ipsa
loquitur jury instruction is the same for a directed verdict-"if
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on whether the
defendant's negligence caused the plaintiffs injury."108 The court
in Linnear clarified that statement, averring that the standard is
only akin to a directed verdict standard when the defendant has
overwhelming evidence on all three factors.109 In that situation, the
res ipsa loquitur jury instruction will not be given."l 0 The court,
however, failed to address what occurs when the plaintiff has
102. MARAIST, supra note 55, § 4.3, at 73.
103. Id.
104. Prosser, supra note 39, at 244. "An 'inference' is a conclusion that an
evidentiary fact exists based on the establishment of a predicate fact." LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 302(4) (2006).
105. Prosser, supra note 39, at 244.
106. Id. "A 'presumption' is an inference created by legislation that the trier
of fact must draw if it finds the existence of the predicate fact unless the trier of
fact is persuaded by evidence of the nonexistence of the fact to be inferred." LA.
CODE EVID. ANN. art. 302(3).
107. Prosser, supra note 39, at 244.
108. Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654, 667
(La. 1990).
109. See Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d
36, 43-44 (La. 2007).
110. Id. at 44.
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overwhelming evidence on all three criteria. Although this
occurrence would be rare because the plaintiff must rely solely on
circumstantial evidence, it is still a possibility. For example, the
man who was poisoned by a decaying human toe has no direct
evidence that the tobacco manufacturer's packaging process
allowed for the toe to be mixed with the tobacco. But the
circumstances of the injury, including the presence of the rotten toe
and the previously sealed condition of the tobacco pouch,
overwhelmingly point to the manufacturer as the cause of the
incident."'
When a plaintiff presents overwhelming evidence like this, the
effect of res ipsa loquitur should be raised to a rebuttable
presumption. In a dissent on a denial for rehearing of Linnear in
the Louisiana Second Circuit, two ad hoc judges argued that this is
a viable solution.112 Their opinion is rooted in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which posits, "It is the function of the court to
determine whether the inference may reasonably be drawn by the
jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn."ll 3 So when the
judge determines whether the res ipsa loquitur instruction reaches
the jury, he can also determine the procedural effect of the
doctrine. In essence, two possible procedural effects of res ipsa
loquitur would exist based on the strength of the plaintiffs
circumstantial evidence: one of a permissive inference and one of a
rebuttable presumption. The ad hoc judges argued that this
presumptive effect "is the strong help that the doctrine was
intended to give."l 1 4
Having res ipsa loquitur amount to a rebuttable presumption, as
opposed to a permissive inference, is a more equitable procedural
effect. A plaintiffs circumstantial evidence in some cases is so
strong that common sense would warrant something higher than a
permissive inference. After all, res ipsa loquitur, as an evidentiary
rule, serves to appraise the value of circumstantial evidence." 5 If
the natural probative evidence presented by the plaintiff shows that
111. Louis L. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3
(1951) ("The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not an arbitrary rule. It is rather a
common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantive evidence. It
requires evidence which shows at least probability that a particular accident
could not have occurred without legal wrong by the defendant.").
112. Judges Gallagher and Gonzales were the two ad hoc judges. Linnear v.
CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 945 So. 2d 1, 15 (La. Ct. App. 2d
2006), rev'd, 966 So. 2d 36 (La. 2007).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328(D)(2) (1965). The three
requirements in Cangelosi are the same as the three requirements in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
114. Linnear, 945 So. 2d at 28 n.8.
115. Jaffe, supra note 111, at 3.
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reasonable minds must find that the defendant was negligent, the
doctrine should effect a presumption.
B. If It Never Creates More Than a Permissive Inference, Why
Have the Doctrine at All?
If the Louisiana Supreme Court holds that the effect of res ipsa
loquitur is always a permissive inference and never a presumption
then there may be no need for the doctrine in our jurisprudence.
After all, a plaintiffs burden of proof-a preponderance of the
evidence-can be met with circumstantial evidence, direct
evidence, or both." 7
As previously mentioned, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine aids in
determining the strength of circumstantial evidence. According
to the facts of a case, the resulting inference from the available
evidence could be either strong or weak.1 9 There is no need,
however, for an elaborate doctrine to determine the strength of
evidence.120 If the "res"-the situation in which the injury
occurred-is to speak for itself, then the courts should let it speak
for itself. The jury, with its common knowledge and experiences,
is quite qualified to determine from the evidence if the injury is of
the type that normally occurs in the absence of negligence and if
the defendant was the negligent party.
116. Prosser, supra note 39, at 258 ("In the nature of the proof involved, a res
ipsa case does not differ from the ordinary case in which the circumstances
indicate that someone must have been negligent, and point to the defendant as
the one responsible."). South Carolina is the only state that does not recognize
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Orr v. Saylor, 169 S.E.2d 396, 397 (S.C. 1969).
117. Prosser, supra note 39, at 257 ("Negligence may be proved by
circumstances, and in a res ipsa case, since there is no direct proof of
negligence, the circumstances are the evidence.").
118. Jaffe, supra note 111, at 3.
119. Prosser, supra note 39, at 262 ("There is no uniform procedural effect of
res ipsa loquitur; it means no more than circumstantial evidence, which may be
strong or weak, according to the facts of the case.").
120. Malone, supra note 2, at 72 ("In truth, a case in which the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies does not differ essentially from any other case in which
the making of inferences plays a dominant role. Its distinguishing characteristic
lies only in the fact that the occurrence of the accident constitutes the given fact
group from which the inference of negligence is drawn. Whether this alone
warrants the creation of a special doctrine and the setting apart of the situation as
one that requires specific rules is a question that is open to serious debate.");
James S. Holliday, Jr., Comment, Problems of Proof: The Function and
Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Louisiana, 25 LA. L. REv. 748, 748 (1965)
("[A]pplication of res ipsa loquitur differs very little from. proof of negligence
by inference from circumstantial evidence which is employed in the vast
majority of tort cases.").
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Therefore, the standard for negligence cases in which the
plaintiff has no direct evidence should be the same as for all other
tort cases. Abolition of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has support
from tort scholar William Prosser, who wrote in 1936, "Along with
res gestae and other unhappy catchwords, the Latin tag should be
consigned to the legal dustbin .... It adds nothing to the law, has
no meaning, which is not more clearly expressed for us in English,
and brings confusion to our legal discussions."l21
Some writers claim that the purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to
allow a plaintiff to present his case when the defendant is in a
superior position with regard to evidence.' 22 However, under the
Linnear rules, a plaintiff in Louisiana has many hurdles to
overcome before he even gets the benefit of the "nudge."
Abolishment of the doctrine would assuage this inequity in two
ways. First, the plaintiff would not have to pass the previously
mentioned Cangelosi three-factor test for his case to reach the jury.
If there is no doctrine, there is no doctrinal test. Second, the
plaintiff has the opportunity to receive a directed verdict in his
favor. 123 If the circumstantial evidence that he presents is
overwhelmingly in his favor, he meets the directed verdict standard
and should receive the benefit of such.
Also, although res ipsa loquitur may, in theory, allow a
plaintiff with no direct evidence to survive both a pre-trial
summary judgment motion and a motion for directed verdict, the
heightened Linnear standard makes this extremely difficult.124
121. Prosser, supra note 39, at 271.
122. Id. at 242-43 ("[T]he force and justification of the principle lies in the
fact that the evidence of the true cause of the accident is accessible to the
defendant, and not accessible to the plaintiff. In other words, that the defendant
is in a position to explain the accident, while the plaintiff is not. This certainly is
mentioned in many cases as a reason for the application of the rule, and there are
even decisions to the effect that res ipsa loquitur is not available to a plaintiff
who is in a better position to produce evidence than the defendant." (footnotes
omitted)).
123. Charles E. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California,
10 S. CAL. L. REv. 166, 171 (1937) ("It is to be observed that, under this view,
the plaintiff is only entitled to the natural probative force of the evidence. In
fact, where the probative force of the evidence in a particular case is very great,
that alone ought to entitle a plaintiff to a directed verdict.").
124. See, for example, recent cases in which a plaintiff pleaded res ipsa
loquitur and the defendant's summary judgment motion was granted: Dronette
v. Shelter Ins. Co., 998 So. 2d 942 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008) (granting summary
judgment because the plaintiff failed to eliminate equally probable causes of the
injury); Trent v. PPG Indus., 930 So. 2d 324 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2006) (affirming
summary judgment because res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable, but with the
dissent commenting that the doctrine was applicable and that summary judgment
should be denied).
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Before the judge can infer negligence, he must determine if
reasonable minds could differ as to all three criteria. However, the
judge can make the inference more easily based on the
circumstantial evidence alone, instead of applying the factors. For
example, the tobacco-chewing plaintiff may allege the following
facts: (1) he was poisoned by a human toe in his chewing tobacco;
(2) the tobacco pouch was sealed prior to use; and (3) he did not
tamper with the pouch or the tobacco in any way. It is very clear
from these alleged facts that the tobacco manufacturer was
probably negligent; however, that inference is less likely to be
drawn when applying the three factors with the strict Linnear
standard. Using common sense to appraise the totality of the
available circumstantial evidence, a judge could reasonably hold a
plaintiffs allegations sufficient to defeat summary judgment and
directed verdict motions. The same may not be true, however,
when applying the more stringent test involving the Cangelosi
factors with the Linnear standard. Using the test developed from
these two opinions, the heightened "reasonable minds" standard
must be applied to each criterion, and the defendant will succeed if
the judge holds reasonable minds could not differ on the non-
fulfillment of any single criterion.
Furthermore, abolishment of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
would also eliminate jury confusion. If courts were confused about
the terms "presumption" and "inference" in the past, juries may be
confused as well. In jury instructions for negligence cases, judges
will often instruct juries that the mere occurrence of an injury does
not warrant a presumption of negligence. In a res ipsa loquitur jury
instruction, however, the jury will additionally be instructed that it
may or may not infer negligence.125 That kind of mixed-up
125. An example of a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction reads:
In the ordinary case, the mere fact that the plaintiff may have suffered
harm does not furnish evidence that it was caused by anyone's
negligence, and the plaintiff must introduce other evidence of some
negligence on the part of the defendant. In a few exceptional cases, the
circumstances involved in or connected with an accident are of such an
unusual character as to justify, in the absence of other evidence bearing
on the subject, the inference that the accident was due to the negligence
of the person having control of the thing which caused the injury. This
inference may be drawn because all of the circumstances surrounding the
accident are of such a character that, unless an explanation can be given,
the only fair and reasonable conclusion is that the accident was due to
some omission of the defendant's duty. This is simply another
formulation of the burden of a plaintiff in a tort action to prove that, more
probably than not, his injury was caused by the negligence of the
defendant. If you believe from the fact of the accident itself and from the
other evidence offered by the plaintiff that the defendant's negligence is
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terminology can certainly cause jury confusion, and it can take
away from the beneficial "nudge" that the plaintiff receives from
the instruction.126 On the other hand, instructions that mention the
Latin phrase by name can have a "talismanic-like effect" on juries
(who, presumably, do not know Latin) and possibly induce them to
rule for the plaintiff when they would not do so otherwise.127
Without the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, these problems would be
nonexistent. Juries would receive typical negligence instructions
that would allow them to decide the issue of defendants'
negligence without the confusing terminology.
The Linnear decision narrowed the scope of the doctrine and
will limit the number of res ipsa loquitur jury instructions given.
Now, plaintiffs must succeed with a stringent standard to receive a
jury instruction, after which they only receive the slight benefit of
a permissive inference. In order to alleviate the inequities in this
strict standard, the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur should be a
rebuttable presumption in those cases in which the plaintiffs
circumstantial evidence is overwhelmingly in his favor. Without
this effect, the doctrine is no longer efficacious and has no place in
Louisiana law.
V. CONCLUSION
So what happens with a man who finds human toes in his
chewing tobacco? He has no direct evidence and no specific
the most plausible explanation for the harm which the plaintiff may have
suffered, you may return a verdict for the plaintiff. If, on the other hand,
you are not convinced by the plaintiffs evidence that it was the
defendant's negligence rather than some other cause which is the most
plausible explanation, then you must return a verdict for the defendant.
H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.18, in 18 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 92 (2d ed. 2001). In Linnear, the plaintiffs' counsel
requested the following instruction: "Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial
evidence which allows a court to infer negligence on the part of the defendant if
the facts indicate the defendant's negligence, more probably than not caused the
injury." Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy/Entex Reliant Energy, 945 So. 2d 1, 7
(La. Ct. App. 2d 2006), rev'd, 966 So. 2d 36 (La. 2007).
126. Prosser, supra note 16, at 218 ("Trial lawyers have more than a suspicion
that the jury either does not understand the instruction or pays no attention to it,
and that it is chiefly a device for getting error into the record."); id. at 230 ("What
a jury makes of such instructions is anyone's guess. It must be agreed that the
average juryman is no intellectual giant, and that he is not likely to be misled by
what he cannot understand; but that is a poor reason for approving an instruction
which even a lawyer must find contradictory and confusing.").
127. Karyn K. Albin, Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Expert Opinion Evidence in
Medical Malpractice Cases: Strange Bedfellows, 82 VA. L. REV. 325, 346 (1996).
2011] NOTE 1109
0LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
explanation of what happened. Yet, it is clear that the manufacturer
is responsible, and the man should recover damages.
In order for him to receive a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur
in Louisiana, as a plaintiff, he must meet the following criteria: (1)
the injury must be the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of negligence; (2) the evidence must sufficiently eliminate
other more probable causes of the injury, such as the conduct of the
plaintiff or a third person; and (3) the negligence must fall within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.128 The judge considers
each criterion individually and sequentially, determining if
reasonable minds could differ on the existence of each.129 If any of
the elements are missing, the instruction will not be given.130 The
Linnear court determined that if the issue reaches the jury and the
jury finds the existence of all criteria, then the effect of the doctrine
is merely a permissive inference.' 3 1
This is a high standard for a plaintiff to meet before recovery.
After twice passing the three-pronged test, the jury is instructed that
it may or may not infer negligence. Instead, the strength of the
plaintiffs circumstantial evidence should determine the effect of the
doctrine. Therefore, in some situations the effect of the doctrine
should be a rebuttable presumption instead of a permissive
inference. After all, finding toes in tobacco is strong evidence
against the manufacturer, especially if the pouch had not been
tampered with.
If Louisiana courts continue to hold that the effect is merely a
permissive inference, plaintiffs are better off without the doctrine
altogether. The circumstance of finding a human toe in a tobacco
pouch would speak for itself without the benefit of Latin
nomenclature. A plaintiff who finds toes in his tobacco could both
survive a directed verdict motion and win the lawsuit with the
circumstances of his injury alone.
Alan W Stewart*
128. Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654,
665-66 (La. 1990).
129. Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 44
(La. 2007).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 42.
* I would like to thank Professors John M. Church, William R. Corbett,
and Frank L. Maraist for assistance in writing this Note.
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